“I can tell the difference between fiction and reality.” Cross-fictionality and Mind-style in Political Rhetoric by Browse, Sam & Hatavara, Mari
“I can tell the difference between fiction and reality.” 
Cross-fictionality and Mind-style in Political Rhetoric
BROWSE, Sam <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8709-5468> and HATAVARA, 
Mari
Available from Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive (SHURA) at:
http://shura.shu.ac.uk/25032/
This document is the author deposited version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher's version if you wish to cite from it.
Published version
BROWSE, Sam and HATAVARA, Mari (2019). “I can tell the difference between 
fiction and reality.” Cross-fictionality and Mind-style in Political Rhetoric. Narrative 
Inquiry, 29 (2), 332-349. 
Copyright and re-use policy
See http://shura.shu.ac.uk/information.html
Sheffield Hallam University Research Archive
http://shura.shu.ac.uk
“I can tell the difference between fiction and reality.” Cross-fictionality and 
Mind-style in Political Rhetoric 
 




In this article, we approach fictionality as a set of semiotic strategies prototypically 
associated with fictional forms of storytelling (Hatavara and Mildorf, 2017a, 2017b). 
Whilst these strategies are strongly associated with fiction, they might also be used in 
non-fictional contexts – or those in which the ontological status of the narrative is 
ambivalent – to create ‘cross-fictional’ rhetorical effects (Hatavara and Mildorf, 2017b). 
We focus on one such strategy – the representation of thought and consciousness. 
Using the concept of ‘mind style’ (Fowler, 1977 and 1996 [1986]; Leech and Short, 
1980; Semino, 2007), we investigate the linguistic representation of the British Prime 
Minister, Theresa May’s, internal monologue in a satirical newspaper article. 
Throughout the article, the author uses cross-fictionality strategies to represent what 
May ‘really thinks’ as she delivers a speech to the Conservative Party conference. The 
stylistic analysis of the Prime Minister’s mind style facilitates an account of the elaborate 
and nuanced mixing of May and the author’s ideological perspectives throughout the 
piece. We argue that this cross-fictional, stylistic approach better accounts for the 
satirical effects of fictionality in the text than those which place a premium on authorial 
intention and the invented nature of the narrative discourse (for example, Nielsen, 
Phelan and Walsh, 2015). 
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Many approaches to fictionality are not interested in the narrative organization of fiction 
or fictionality, but focus instead on the referential status of the story content. 
Additionally, some recent approaches to fictionality actually contradict the very essence 
of fiction, that is the multilayered communication model including the separation of 
narrator from the author. Both of these observations can be identified in, for example, 
the rhetorical approach that defines fictionality as “the intentional use of invented stories 
and scenarios” (Nielsen, Phelan & Walsh, 2015, p. 62). The use of ‘invented’ refers to 
the nature of the story content and the question of (non)referentiality whilst ‘intentional’ 
addresses authorial intention, therefore short-circuiting fictional communications 
multilayeredness. By multilayeredness, we mean the commonly held understanding that 
a text represents a narrator who tells about the experience of a character, and only the 
analysis of character’s and narrator’s discourses enables the reader to make 
assumptions of (implied) author’s intentions (see Chatman, 1980, pp. 81-88, 148; 
Genette, 1988, pp. 13-15, 141). 
For a narrative scholar, both these emphases seem unavailing. Narratologists can best 
contribute to the manifold discussion on fictionality through analysis of the narrative 
features and organization of the materials studied. Moreover, while fiction as a genre 
and fictionality as a feature of a text are not the same, their characteristics overlap. 
What is more, narratology lacks the means to enter the minds of authors (unless 
perhaps with the use of fictionality as a research method) that would be needed in order 
to study authorial intentions. Narratology is instead better equipped to analyze textual 
agents like narrators and characters as well as the narrative means and modes used to 
represent a world and the minds therein. The question of whether and in what ways 
fictional modes of mind representation affect the communicative frame of a nonfictional 
representation remains largely unstudied but has potential to contribute to questions of 
storytelling interaction and rhetorics. 
While there is not room to do that thoroughly here, we refer to Seymor Chatman’s take 
on the question of the implied author, once at least as actively debated a concept as 
fictionality is today. For Chatman, the analytically interesting question “is not whether 
the implied author ​exists​” but “what we ​get ​from positing such a concept” (Chatman, 
1990, 75; emphasis in the text). This article is first and foremost aimed at finding out 
what narratology with its tools for analyzing narrative minds, mostly develop by 
analyzing fictional minds, can contribute to the study of minds that are represented 
outside of the genre of fiction; what we can ​get ​from positing that fictionality is about 
narrative discourse modes. 
We take a text analytical approach, using a narratological and stylistic methodology to 
concentrate on the features of the text that suggest fictionality. More precisely, we study 
how the mind of another is represented in a non-fictional narrative environment. To 
further illuminate the study of minds in “cross-fictional” instances where narratives 
globally marked as nonfiction use fictional discursive modes (Hatavara & Mildorf, 
2017b), we introduce the concept of mind style to fictionality studies (see Fowler, 1977 
& 1996 [1986]; Leech and Short, 1980; Semino, 2007). Previous narratological analyses 
of fictional modes in nonfictional environments have used a speech category approach 
and focalization theory (Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017a, 2017b; Hatavara, 2016; see 
Herman, 2011, 6-17 for an overview of approaches). In this article, mind style is used to 
further develop methods of analyzing discursive modes of mind representation 
characteristic of fiction but used in nonfictional narrative environments. The analysis 
exposes how fictional narrative modes are used in narrative contestation over political 
issues. Our example comes from the political sphere and is a satirical commentary by 
John Rentoul on a conference speech by Theresa May, published in ​The Independent 
on October 3rd, 2018. The very title of the piece raises the question of mind 
representation and even attribution: “Theresa May’s conference speech: what she said - 
and what she really meant”. Through narratological and stylistic analysis, this article 
sheds light on larger concerns in narrative studies concerning narratives of vicarious 
experience as well as storytelling rights, empathy and irony. 
 
 
Fictionality and narratology 
 
Mari Hatavara and Jarmila Mildorf (2017a & 2017b), suggest that fictionality studies 
should be more geared towards narrative features in order to counterbalance many of 
the recent fictionality definitions among narrative scholars focusing on the invented 
nature of the story and authorial intention. Similarly, in her overview of fictionality, 
Monika Fludernik (2018, p. 69) recommends that approaches linking fictionality to 
narrative need to explore their understandings of narrativity. Our approach also rests on 
the definition Fludernik (1996, p. 20, 2009, p. 6) offers for narrativity as the 
representation of human experientiality. We do not, however, agree with Fludernik’s 
assertion that narrativity is “not a quality inhering in a text, but rather an attribute 
imposed on the text by the reader who interprets the text as narrative, thus ​narrativizing 
the text” (Fludernik, 2003, p. 244; emphasis in the text).​  ​We focus on the text, at the 
same time emphasizing that ​how​ experientiality is represented also affects ​what ​is or 
can be represented. Therefore we claim it is crucial to study semiotic features - in our 
case the linguistic properties of narrative representation.  
 
The narrative-based signposts of fictionality have most often been understood in terms 
of the synchronic story-discourse relationship, the separation of narrator from the 
author, and the representation of mind (Cohn, 1990, p. 800; Grishakova, 2008, p. 65). 
Hatavara and Mildorf concentrate on those where the narrator represents the 
consciousness of another thus mixing two discursive subjects, using internal focalization 
or using verbs of consciousness (Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017a, pp. 67-68, 2017b, p. 392). 
Free indirect discourse is, of course, the prime example of a discursive blend.These 
linguistically identifiable features of the text make evident the basic distinctions of story 
and discourse as well as narrator and character in fictional narratives: both distinctions 
are made subject to interpretation as the narrating person on the discursive level takes 
privileges over the story level where the experience of another is placed (Hatavara & 
Mildorf, 2017a, p. 80, 2017b, p. 405). 
 
Hatavara and Mildorf (2017b, p. 405) emphasize that fictionality is a question of quality 
and not of genre, and therefore needs to be studied in a way sensitive to the semiotic 
factors of narrative, not confined to the authorial intentions or to the ontological status of 
the subject matter. With examples from life story interviews, oral history interviews and 
online museum exhibition narratives, Hatavara and Mildorf show real life storytellers 
present narratives of vicarious experience, that is they tell about the experiences of 
other nonfictional people who become characters in their stories. These fictional modes 
of mind and consciousness representation are used locally in narrative environments 
that are globally marked as non-fiction. Therefore, Hatavara and Mildorf (2017b) 
suggest the term cross-fictionality to denote narrative features of mind representation 
that are characteristic of fiction but found in globally nonfictional narrative environments.  
 
This definition of cross-fictionality enables us to apply and develop narratological tools 
and methods for analyzing represented minds across the fact-fiction divide. In a recent 
article, Greger Andersson and Tommy Sandberg (2018) bring to a head the discussion 
on whether narratological theories and methodologies can or should be applied across 
fictional and nonfictional narrative realms. They argue for what they call the difference 
approach which regards fiction as a language game of its own, separate from other 
narrative instances. For this reason, Andersson and Sandberg (2018, pp. 242, 256-257) 
also suggest a need for a different type of narratology to be used in the study of fiction 
than those used in the study of other narratives in order not to fall prey to the simplifying 
theoretical practices of their postulated sameness approach. Our claim is that narrative 
discourse modes ​do​ travel across the factual or fictional divide and that it is therefore 
fruitful to test if the methodologies to analyze these modes would also work in both 
fact-fiction contexts. At the same time we do not claim sameness of minds represented 
in different narrative environments. Even though similarities exist in the narrative 
modes, this does not (necessarily) lead to sameness of functions or interpretative 
conclusions (cf. Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017a, pp. 79-80). 
 
Fictionality studies that study textual features - such as the present article - are often 
confronted with the accusation of essentialism and a reference to a famous statement 
by Searle: “there is no trait or set of traits which all works of literature have in common 
and which could constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a work of 
literature” (1975, p. 320). Indeed, fictionality is not an on-or-off-feature, like the genre of 
fiction. However, discourse-narratological modes of language use can be characteristic 
of fiction but not bound to it alone (cf. Genette, 1990, pp. 772-773). There is therefore 
nothing essentializing in saying that some narrative discourse modes, like FID, have 
been mostly cultivated in fictional literature but are also used in other, nonfictional 
narratives. As Cohn (1999, p. 117) has pointed out, the example from a novel by Iris 
Murdock that Searle uses to prove his case actually contradicts it, since it showcases 
how portraying the workings of another mind is a convention in the novel. Cohn’s 
question is, if any serious discourse would quote the thoughts of a person other than the 
speaker themself. With the analysis of our example we hope to further demonstrate that 
cross-fictional representations do precisely that. 
 
Understood as cross-fictionality, fictionality becomes not just a tautological feature of 
fiction or something completely separate from the basic features of fiction such as the 
author-narrator separation. Cross-fictional studies seek the characteristically fictional 
modes of mind representation outside the generic boundaries of fiction. Fiction as genre 
is a large scale phenomenon, which determines the status of a textual whole, a work (of 
art). This fact-fiction genre distinction depends mostly on paratextual signs that 
surround the text. Cross-fictional narrative modes, however, are identifiable on the 
textual level (Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017b). The approach is inspired by those first 
attempts to define fictionality in narrative terms (cf. Cohn, 1990) as well as 
groundbreaking studies that concentrate on some of these fictional modes of mind 
representation like FID and understand them not as exclusively literary but still 
characteristic of the fictional (see McHale, 1978). Therefore, we do not agree with 
Cohn’s statement that “narrative fiction is the only literary genre, as well as the only kind 
of narrative, in which the unspoken thoughts, feelings, perceptions of a person other 
than the speaker can be portrayed” (Cohn, 1978, pp. 7-8), but still believe the portrayal 
of another person’s mind is essential to fictionality. 
 
Understanding fictionality this way emphasizes language as the material of fiction and 
the artistic nature of fiction: every art form necessarily modifies and shapes its material 
basis. Fiction, and literature at large has often been understood as a laboratory for 
ideas (cf. Grishakova, 2013, p. 7), and some understand fictionality as a way to test 
different event scenarios (cf. Nielsen, Phelan & Walsh, 2015). Based on our emphasis 
on fictionality as a quality of narrative discourse modes we also propose that fictionality 
is a mode of language use, where linguistic modes can be invented and tested. This is 
partially in line with Monika Fludernik’s diachronic narratology where new narrative 
modes are developed and then become conventionalized. We argue that these 
conventions of language use may reach other than fictional narrative realms; fiction is, 
after all, not separate from other linguistic practices even if it has its own generic 
features. 
Hatavara and Mildorf (2017a, p. 67) note that ‘[t]he one fictionalizing technique most 
clearly distinguishable on the discursive level because of its linguistic markers is the 
representation of thought and consciousness’. The linguistic representation of 
consciousness in narrative discourse has also been a key concern of scholars in 
stylistics investigating ‘mind style’. Given the importance of representations of 
consciousness to prototypical conceptions of fiction, in this paper we use the concept of 
mind style to operationalise an analysis of fictionality in the op-ed article by the 
journalist, John Rentoul. 
 
 
Fictionality and mind style 
The term, ‘mind style’, was first coined by Fowler (1977, p. 103) ‘to refer to any 
distinctive linguistic presentation of an individual mental self’ and, later, ‘the world view 
of an author, or a narrator, or a character constituted by the ideational structure of the 
text’ (Fowler, 1996 [1986], p. 214; we return to the problems with this second definition 
shortly). As Leech and Short (1981, p. 153) suggest, ‘mind style’ is a particularly 
appropriate term where the linguistic choices made throughout a text consistently reflect 
a particular worldview or set of cognitive habits. Fowler (1977, 1996 [1986]) gives 
Halliday’s (1971) influential stylistic analysis of Golding’s ​The Inheritors​ as an example 
of such consistent linguistic choices. For the most part, the novel is narrated by a third 
person heterodiegetic narrator focalised through the perspective of Lok, the novel’s 
Neanderthal protagonist. Halliday (1971, p. 350) argued that the grammatical choices in 
The Inheritors​ represent Lok’s primitive ‘limitations of understanding’. He explains that 
‘[verb] processes are seldom represented as resulting from an experiential cause; in 
those cases where they are, the agent is seldom a human being; and where it is a 
human being, it is seldom one of the [Neanderthals]’ (Halliday, 1971, p. 353; for further 
discussion of mind style in ​The Inheritors​, see Black, 1993; Browse, 2018a; Clark, 2009; 
Hoover, 1999). These transitivity patterns reflect Lok’s inability to understand patterns of 
cause and effect (although see Hoover 1999, who disputes and refines this analysis). 
Although Halliday (1971) did not use the term, for Fowler (1977, 1996 [1986]) these 
consistent linguistic choices constitute Lok’s idiosyncratic mind style. 
 
Although both Fowler (1977) and Leech and Short (1981) suggest that analyses of 
authors, narrators and characters’ mind styles are possible, to date the focus has been 
on atypical character or narrator mind styles, particularly those that are neuro-atypical 
(Bockting, 1994; Fowler, 1977, 1996 [1986]; Harrison, 2017; Semino, 2011, 2014; 
Semino and Swindlehurst, 1996), primitive (Black, 1993; Browse, 2018a; Clark, 2009; 
Fowler, 1977, 1996 [1986]; Halliday, 1971; Hoover, 1999), suffering from alcoholic 
blackouts (Giovanelli, 2018), criminally sociopathic (Semino, 2002), or even vampiric 
(Nuttall, 2015). It is right that the focus has been on the narrator and character levels of 
narrative discourse. As Semino (2007, p. 169) notes, the concept of mind style should 
be differentiated from “the more general notion of ‘style’” (see also Semino and 
Swindlehurst, 1996, p. 145), understood as the linguistic patterns and peculiarities 
constituting an author or speaker’s idiolectal use of language. For this reason, we 
suggest that the term ‘mind style’ should only be applied to textual representations of 
consciousness that involve crossing what Stockwell (2009), in a related discussion, has 
described as a ‘fictionality boundary’, be that an ontological boundary (in the case of 
fictional characters) or an epistemological one (in the case of real people whose 
thoughts we can never really know). Indeed, the latter constitutes a case of 
cross-fictional mind representation -  a case in which a real mind is fictionalized in a 
text. 
A related concept to mind style is ‘world view’. Fowler (1996 [1986], p. 214) conflates 
the two terms, suggesting that the former is a less cumbersome term for ‘point of view 
on the ideological plane’. Indeed, discussions of ideological point of view and mind style 
have often appeared alongside each other (for example, Simpson 1993). As above, 
Semino (2007) similarly warns against such a conflation. A notable feature of ideological 
perspectives is that they are shared by groups of people. It is therefore not sufficient to 
conceive of mind style ​only​ in terms of ideological point of view, because mind styles 
reflect the particular idiosyncratic perspectives of narrators or characters; it is 
consequently also important to include their individual cognitive habits and fictional 
mental functioning. Mind styles, then, can be defined as the combined textual 
representation of a narrator or character’s worldview alongside their internal mental 
processes, such as ‘thoughts, memories, intentions, desires, evaluations, feelings [and] 
emotions’ (Semino 2007, p. 169). 
Stylistic analyses of the linguistic representation of fictional consciousness have 
encompassed a wide array of discourse structures. Following Halliday (1971), Fowler’s 
(1977 & 1996 [1986]) earliest investigations deal with grammatical transitivity and 
participant relationships (see also Ji and Shen, 2004; Leech and Short, 1981, pp. 
152-153; Semino, 2002, p. 101) but also under-lexicalisation – ‘when a non-specific 
noun […] is used to refer to something for which a specific word exists’ (Black, 1993, p. 
41). For instance, in ​The Inheritors​, Lok uses the term ‘white bone thing’ to describe an 
arrowhead, which reflects his ignorance of ​homo sapiens​ hunting technology (for 
analyses of under-lexicalisation and mind style, see Black, 1993; Leech and Short, 
1981; Semino, 2002). Scholars have also focused on the way that syntactic structures 
of different complexity might construct different mind styles (Leech and Short, 1981, pp. 
164-165; Semino, 2007, p. 167) and on the use of deictic words (Semino, 2011). In 
addition, many researchers have examined the use of metaphor in the creation of mind 
style (Leech and Short, 1981, p. 160), with these analyses often taking influence from 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory (see Black, 1993; Semino, 
2002, 2007; Semino and Swindlehurst, 1996). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), 
conventional linguistic metaphors (such as ‘we were good friends, but ​drifted apart​’) 
suggest underlying conceptual mappings between different aspects of human 
experience, such that one domain structures another (our sense of ​SPACE ​or 
PROXIMITY​, here, structuring our conceptualisation of ​SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS​).  
If metaphorical mappings between different conceptual domains structure the way we 
think, then it follows that a character or narrator’s unusual reliance on a particular 
conceptual metaphor, or the repetition of a novel conceptual metaphor, form a part of 
their mind style. For example, Semino (2002) demonstrates that Clegg, the sociopathic 
lepidopterist and narrator of John Fowles’ ​The Collector​, tends to repeat the 
misogynistic metaphor ​WOMEN ARE BUTTERFLIES​ throughout the novel. She argues that 
this habit of conceptualisation is a feature of Clegg’s idiosyncratic mind style (for further 
analyses of mind style from a cognitive linguistic perspective, see also Harrison [2017], 
Giovanelli [2018] and Nuttall [2015, 2018], who all use cognitive grammar [Langacker, 
1987, 1991, 2008] to explore the manner in which mind styles are constructed). Finally, 
a feature of some work has been to examine the pragmatic strategies used to construct 
unusual mind styles (Clark, 2009; Semino, 2014). For instance, Semino (2014) outlines 
the way in which the mind styles of autistic characters in three novels include atypical 
politeness strategies, problems with informativeness and relevance in interaction, and a 
difficulty in understanding figurative language. 
To this list of discourse structures, we would add modality. As Thompson (2014, p. 70) 
suggests, the use of modality creates “a kind of interpersonal ‘aura’ of the speaker's 
attitude around [a] proposition”. The use of modality, then, is important for constructing 
a speaker – or writer’s – point of view in a text (Simpson, 1993). The study of modality 
was traditionally confined to the closed set of modal auxiliary verbs (Nuyts, 2006; 
Perkins, 1983). However, Simpson (1993) outlines three kinds of modality – epistemic 
(that which relates to knowledge and perception), deontic (duties and obligation) and 
boulomaic (wishes and desires) – and broadens the scope of the term to encompass 
lexical verbs (for example, ‘she ​seemed​ happy’ – which is epistemic modality) and even 
whole phrases (‘I would rather’ – boulomaic). This is a useful framework for analysing 
point of view – which we have suggested is an important part of mind style – and should 
therefore be included in any list of discursive strategies that might contribute to the 
creation of a mind style. The list is not meant as exhaustive, nor is the claim being made 
that the use of these discursive structures necessarily engenders mind style. Rather, 
they constitute a list of discourse features that in some contexts have been shown to 
have the functional affordance of constructing a particular worldview or representation 
of a particular set of cognitive habits. For that reason they form the starting point of our 
analysis of cross-fictionality and mind style in the following section. 
 
Fictionality and mind style in political punditry 
As we have noted, mind style in narrative texts involves crossing either an ontological or 
epistemological boundary – textually representing the internal mental functioning of 
minds that are either not real or that can never really be known – and is therefore a key 
‘signpost of fictionality’ (Cohn, 1990; see also Hatavara and Mildorf, 2017a, 2017b). 
Whereas discourse modes of mind and consciousness representation that rely on 
speech categories and distinguish narrator’s and characters’ points of view 
predominantly rely on verb tenses, personal pronouns and deictic markers, mind style 
enables detecting a wider array of idiosyncratic linguistic features to analyze how the 
mind of another may be represented in a cross-fictional manner. In this section, we 
analyse how John Rentoul, the political editor of ​The Independent​, ‘models’ (c.f. 
Stockwell, 2009) the mind of Theresa May, the British Prime Minister, as she delivers a 
speech to the 2018 Conservative Party Conference. To do this, he creates a distinctive 
mind style for May, the features of which we describe below. 
Constructing May’s Mind Style 
In the op-ed ‘Theresa May’s conference speech: what she said – and what she really 
meant’ Rentoul alternates between direct reports of what May said (signalled with the 
reporting clause ‘what she said’) followed by his commentary on the speech (indicated 
with the clause, ‘what she meant’ and graphologically signalled with italics). This 
unpacking of politicians’ public verbal performances is a regular feature of political 
punditry (Browse, 2018b) and Rentoul is certainly not the only journalist to use this style 
of reporting (for example, see Clark, 2015, or Perkins, 2016). However, whereas other 
commentators tend to offer explanations for the quoted lines in their own voice, what 
perhaps distinguishes Rentoul is the way in which he represents May’s motives; the 
commentary comes in the form of direct thought representation (see Leech and Short, 
1980, Ch.10), or quoted interior monologue to use Cohn’s (1978) terminology. Indeed, 
this style of reporting the Prime Minister’s thoughts adds to the satirical quality of the 
piece insofar as it echoes a convention in women’s magazines of “translating” the 
discourse of prospective romantic partners.  
The most obvious indicator of this direct thought representation is the pronominal 
choices used in the text and other forms of what Semino (2011) calls ‘person deixis’ – 
deictic words that index the personal and social relationships between people (see also 
Stockwell, 2002). Throughout the ‘what she meant’ sections of the piece, ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘us’, 
‘my’, and ‘our’ all refer to May or the Conservative Party, and ‘you’, the audience. The 
thoughts attributed to May sometimes also include vocative addresses to other 
politicians, for example: 
What she said:​ I’ve seen the trailers for Bodyguard, and let me tell you – it 
wasn’t like that in my day. 
What she meant:​ ​Unlike some people, Boris Johnson, I can tell the difference 
between fiction and reality.  
In the quote from the speech, May alludes to a television series, ‘Bodyguard’, about a 
policeman whose job it is to protect the British Home Secretary, a position May held 
prior to her assumption of the premiership. Here, in the representation of her thought, 
the quote is interpreted as an attack on her Conservative rival for the party leadership, 
Boris Johnson. The use of vocatives (‘Boris Johnson’, and elsewhere in the article, 
‘ladies and gentlemen’), in addition to the pronominal choices, indicate that the 
viewpoint in the ‘what she meant’ sections should be interpreted as May’s. Indeed, in 
this specific example, the clash of tone between the reported speech and thought also 
contributes to the character of the mind style created for May. The original section of 
speech is an appeal to the politician’s ethos – she is demonstrating her awareness of 
mass culture and uses a colloquial expression ‘in my day’, both of which constitute a 
form of ‘public construction of normalness’ (Fairclough, 2000, p. 99) and assume a 
shared familiarity with May’s political career. Conversely, the reported thought is not an 
attempt to build rapport with an audience, but is instead an attack on a political 
opponent, Boris Johnson, whom she is represented as implying cannot ‘tell the 
difference between fiction and reality’. This contrast in the interpersonal quality of the 
speech and thought representation contributes to a dissembling mind style that runs 
through the whole text. 
May’s mind style is also constructed throughout the text through modality, evaluative 
language and what Simpson (1993) terms ​verba sentiendi​ – language that presupposes 
some form of cognisor: 
What she said:​ Security is the bedrock of freedom… the freedom that swept 
across Europe when the Soviet Union collapsed, and nations were reborn in 
sovereignty and independence. 
What she meant:​ ​what Jeremy Hunt should have said in his ridiculous 
leadership bid the other day. 
In this example, May’s remarks on foreign policy are interpreted as an implicit criticism 
of her Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt. Hunt had previously given a well-received 
speech to the conference which many perceived as an attempt to position the minister 
for a leadership challenge. May’s supposed criticisms are constructed through the use 
of the deontic modal, ‘should’ and the evaluative pre-modifier, ‘ridiculous’. As in the 
previous example, the mind style constructed in the ‘what she meant’ section is at odds 
with the tone of the reported speech. In the quotation from the speech, May uses a 
variety of words – ‘security’, ‘freedom’, ‘nations’, ‘reborn’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘independence’ 
– that all suggest a solemn register of statecraft which is contrasted in the reported 
thought with another attack on a colleague.  Again, the effect is to portray the Prime 
Minister as disingenuous; she is not really concerned with the political values she lists, 
but in using them to jockey for position against her opponents in the Conservative Party. 
Verba sentiendi​ and evaluative language are later used to resume the reproaches of 
Boris Johnson in a similar fashion: 
What she said:​ Britain isn’t afraid to leave with no deal if we have to. But we 
need to be honest about it. Leaving without a deal – introducing tariffs and costly 
checks at the border – would be a bad outcome for the UK and the EU. 
What she meant:​ ​I am not afraid of Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson. 
As before, the discussion of statecraft – the UK’s negotiations with the EU over Brexit – 
is reframed as an attack on an internal political enemy. Rentoul uses ​verba sentiendi​ to 
formulate a claim that May makes about her emotional state of mind (she is ‘not afraid’). 
The claim itself is suspicious; in a similar manner to the disnarrated, negation 
foregrounds an expectation  (see Karttunen 2008, p. 420; and also Nahajec, 2009) - in 
this instance, the expectation that the Prime Minister might actually be afraid after all. It 
should also be noted that Johnson is here referred to by his full name, ‘Alexander Boris 
de Pfeffel Johnson’. Johnson is known as a “hard Brexiteer” in favour of leaving the EU 
without a trade deal. This group of politicians often use right wing populist rhetorical 
strategies, constructing an identity between themselves and “the man on the street”. 
The naming strategy is evaluative because the aristocratic background indexed by 
Johnson’s lengthy and (ironically) German full name casts some doubt on his claim to 
represent the will of ordinary people. 
As these three examples demonstrate, a key pragmatic feature of May’s mindstyle is 
the way her directly reported thoughts clash with the reported speech from the 
conference address. This dissonance portrays May as cynical and dissembling: where 
she attempts to form relationships with her audience, she is actually thinking of her 
opponents; where she claims to be concerned with great issues of state, she is in fact 
preoccupied with the internal politics of the Conservative Party. 
Thoughts embedded in thoughts 
The analysis is complicated by a third voice in the text which can be attributed not only 
to May’s words or a projected internal monologue, but to Rentoul’s personal evaluation 
of the speech: 
What she said:​ Let’s say it loud and clear: Conservatives will always stand up 
for a politics that unites us rather than divides us. That used to be Labour’s 
position too. But when I look at its leadership today, I worry it’s no longer the 
case. 
What she meant:​ ​Let us divide ourselves from that Marxist fanatic while 
spouting platitudes about unity. 
Characteristically, the ‘what she said’ section contradicts the ‘what she meant’ section; 
the former is a claim to promote unity, the latter a call for division. There are a number 
of linguistic features in the first clause (‘let us divide ourselves from that Marxist fanatic’) 
that suggest this is May’s perspective. The thought is an imperative addressed to her 
audience, the pronominal choice ‘us’ and the reflexive pronoun ‘ourselves’ all refer to 
the Prime Minister and the Conservative Party, she uses the evaluative naming strategy 
‘that Marxist fanatic’ (a reference to the left-wing leader of the opposition, Jeremy 
Corbyn), and the distal deictic ‘that’ to signal ‘our’ ideological distance from the leader of 
the Labour Party. All these linguistic features construct an interpersonal and ideological 
locus consonant with May’s. In the following clause, though, she describes her own 
linguistic behaviour as ‘spouting platitudes about unity’. Both ‘spouting’ and platitudes’ 
connote a negative attitude to what the Conservative politician has said which is 
marked, given that this is a thought attributed to her. There are two interpretations, here. 
One is to say that whilst this is presented as May’s thought, it is actually Rentoul’s more 
or less overt comment on what she has said – he is explicitly criticizing her, in his own 
voice, for being vacuous. Indeed, that this is a metatextual comment about the speech 
connotes the presence of a narrator at a higher diegetic level to May’s internal 
consciousness, thus supporting this view. Another interpretation is to say that this is 
also​ what the Prime Minister thinks – that she too believes she is ‘spouting platitudes’. 
From this perspective, May is at fault precisely because she ​agrees​ with Rentoul that 
the speech lacks any substance and yet cynically mouths the words for political 
advantage.  
A similar blurring of the journalist and politician’s voices is repeated later in the article: 
What she said:​ we have fundamental strengths as a country… English… global 
language… free trade… But our greatest strength of all is the talent and diversity 
of our people. 
What she meant:​ Our greatest export is prefabricated slabs of cliché. 
With the exception of the reporting clause, ‘what she meant’, there is nothing else to 
suggest this is May’s thought (‘our’, here, refers generically to the whole nation, which is 
inclusive of, but not limited to, the Prime Minister and members of the Conservative 
Party. It could therefore index the speaker as Rentoul or indeed anyone belonging to 
that generic group). As in the previous example, there is a similar ambiguity over to 
whom the opinion should be attributed. Certainly, the pejorative noun phrase 
‘prefabricated slabs of cliché’ suggests this is the journalist’s opinion, but it could also 
be May’s. Again, if it is the former, then the Prime Minister is criticised as vacuous, or, if 
the latter, cynical. Interestingly, there is a further ambiguity in the reported speech. The 
‘prefabricated slabs of cliché’ are elliptically listed, ‘English…global language… free 
trade’. This is mimetic in two senses: first, of the experience of someone who is in the 
conference hall but not really listening to the speech (presumably because they have 
heard the clichés before); second, of the style in which a speech writer or advisor might 
list a series of talking points. The speech itself, then, is also narrated from an 
ambiguous perspective.  
At times, this embedding of Rentoul’s thoughts in May’s is more subtle, for example: 
What she said:​ No institution embodies our principles as Conservatives more 
profoundly or more personally than our National Health Service. 
What she meant:​ ​Substitute “as the Labour Party” and Corbyn could have said 
the same last week. I am not letting them own that territory.  
What she said:​ We have had disagreements in this party about Britain’s 
membership of the EU for a long time. So, it is no surprise that we have had a 
range of different views expressed this week. But my job as prime minister is to 
do what I believe to be in the national interest. 
What she meant:​ ​The Tony Blair gambit: win points for candour – divided party 
– then use it to show leadership. I’ll do what I believe to be right even if my party 
hates it.  
In both quotations from the speech, May is talking about ‘principles’ and what she 
‘believe[s] to be in the national interest’. Contrastingly, in both subsequent ‘what she 
meant’ sections this is reframed as a form of political positioning. In the second 
sentence of each, it is May’s perspective that is constructed through the use of 
pronominal choices (‘​I​ am not letting ​them​ own that territory’; ‘​I​’ll do what ​I​ believe to be 
right even if ​my​ party hates it’). In the first, however, it is unclear who is speaking; one 
could interpret them either as Rentoul’s commentary on what he perceives as May’s 
political manoeuvring, or as May’s cynical self-awareness of the rhetorical performance 
she is giving. If compared to Cohn’s (1978) model of consciousness representation, 
these “what she meant” sections can be interpreted not as quotations from May’s inner 
speech but coming close to psychonarration, where the narrating voice takes over to 
portray the deepest, perhaps even unconscious feelings and desires of a character. 
This is the mode where the narrator most clearly takes discursive and epistemological 
advantage over a character in portraying inner states not consciously known to the 
character themself (see Palmer 2005). 
Ambivalence over the speaker and the point of view is also reflected in Rentoul’s use of 
metaphor: 
What she said:​ The British people need to know that the end is in sight. And our 
message to them must be this: we get it. 
What she meant:​ ​The light at the end of the tunnel is a train coming in our 
direction. 
Here, May is talking about the conclusion of the Brexit process. The metaphor Rentoul 
uses is a play on the English expression ‘there’s light at the end of the tunnel’, which 
means that things are bad now but look as though they might be getting better. The 
expression relies on a conventional conceptual mapping between brightness and a 
positive value judgement (​LIGHT IS GOOD​/​DARK IS BAD​). In the reported thought section, 
this conventional mapping is flipped to imply the opposite of what May means in the 
quotation from the speech. Rather than the light being a sign that we are about to leave 
the bad situation, it is instead a portent of something more dangerous to come. As 
before, we can either interpret this directly as Rentoul’s opinion or as May’s as well. 
Whereas the previous examples all involved some meta-linguistic commentary 
(‘spouting platitudes’ or ‘cliché’), this use of metaphor is interesting because the blurring 
of voices suggests that this textual representation of May might agree her Brexit 
negotiations will end in disaster (indeed, later she is reported as thinking ‘prepare for the 
next recession’). The journalist’s critique, here, is not only directed at the style May uses 
and the way it positions her in relation to her political opponents, but at the content of 
her argument; that is, she is either deluded or, if we assume that this is not only 
Rentoul’s opinion about the likely outcome of Brexit but that he believes May thinks this 
too, then he is accusing her of actively misleading electors. What is more, it may even 
be interpreted as Rentoul - as the narrator - exposing May’s deepest fear, one she 
herself denies feeling (cf. the previous ‘I’m not afraid’) but which nevertheless hunts her 
in the form of a metaphorical train she feels approaching. 
 
Conclusion 
Our article demonstrates that fictionality studies benefits from analyzing narrative 
features characteristic of fiction in nonfictional narrative environments​. ​Using the 
concept of mind style in addition to speech category-based or focalization-centered 
methods to study mind representation helps to further elaborate the ideological and 
linguistic mixing of points of view in cross-fictional representations, to pinpoint how the 
mind of another person can be portrayed as if known, transparent or accessible (cf. 
Herman, 2011) to the speaker or author of a nonfictional narrative. The analysis further 
demonstrates that cross-fictional mind representation introduces interpretative 
uncertainty as to whose point of view is put forward in ambiguous parts of the text (cf. 
Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017a, p. 80). Therefore, an affordance of cross-fictional mind 
presentation is that authors can hint at different possibilities and internal contradictions 
in the mental interiors they represent. 
The question of whose mind - feelings, intentions, desires - is represented in the text 
can be dealt with in terms of cross-fictionality in a more nuanced way than if we assume 
a binary conception of fictionality based on non/referentiality, as exemplified in Nielsen, 
Phelan and Walsh’s (2015) approach. Fictional modes of mind representation create 
local points of discursive blending and uncertainty within the globally nonfictional text 
that may be used for rhetorical purpose. The text we have chosen to analyse is a form 
of political satire. As Simpson (2003, p. 98) notes, ‘a peculiarity of satirical discourse [is] 
that it can at once sustain a text which is part “referential”, part “fictional”’. Moreover, it 
often relies on metonymic relationships between the fictional and the referential 
components that amplify and exaggerate aspects of the satirical target (Simpson, 2003, 
p. 129). Whilst the exact thoughts attributed to May are ‘invented’ (Nielsen, Phelan & 
Walsh, 2015), the point of the satire is that there is, according to Rentoul, nonetheless 
some truth to them - they are an exaggerated caricature of what May ‘really meant’ and, 
crucially, they say something about the kind of dissembling and cynical politician he 
thinks May ‘really’ is. Perspectives such as the rhetorical approach which make a clear 
distinction between invention and reality cannot account for this ontological 
ambivalence. Conversely, treating fictionality as a quality that is discursively signalled in 
a text - as we have done here - relegates the ontological status of the subject matter to 
a secondary concern. One of the affordances of cross-fictionality, then, is that it better 
accounts for the way in which fictional modes of mind representation can be used as a 
strategy to argue a point in the real world.  
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